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ESSAYS
GENETIC THERAPY: ETHICAL AND
RELIGIOUS REFLECTIONS*
James M. Gustafson **

To write a brief history of the discussions of ethics and human genetic
research and therapy is something of a temptation, but one to be overcome.
All that is needed is a reminder of the publications edited by Michael Hamilton, the conferences on ethical issues involved in recombinant DNA research and the subsequent NIH guidelines, the project of the Hastings
Center funded by the NIH,' the numerous papers by persons who were clinically involved in genetic research and therapy, the contributions by a
number of authors from the fields of ethics, law, and theology, and the
changes in judgment by significant persons in biological sciences about the
moral risks involved. After more than twenty years of reflection and publication, whether there are some truly new issues for ethics and religious
thought to deal with is an open question. Deeply involved in discussions in
this area two decades ago, preparations for this paper mark a return of my
attention to an area that had been subordinated as a result of other projects
and interests. I am loathe to contribute to the redundance in the ethical
literature.
Many new factors have come into being in the genetic research and therapy field during the last several years. There is new knowledge about human
genetics, and with the Human Genome Initiative this will expand at a dazzling rate. As a result of this knowledge new opportunities for therapeutic
interventions have developed. There is a new moral and public consciousness about therapeutic research in its experimental phases and a notable sensitivity and sophistication about ethical issues on the part of many
* This paper was originally presented at a symposium entitled "Genetic Engineering
and Humanness: A Revolutionary Prospect" on September 30, 1991 at the Washington
National Cathedral, Washington, D.C. Reprinted with permission from CATHEDRAL PAPERS
(Michael P. Hamilton ed. forthcoming 1992).
** Henry R. Luce Professor of Humanities and Comparative Studies, Emory University.
1. The papers from this project are found in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
OF SCREENING FOR HUMAN DISEASE (Daniel Bergsma ed., 1974).
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investigators. While some investigators might still feel that the authority of
regulations is a restraining externality, for many the ethical sensitivity and
sophistication is clearly a matter of internal conviction and importance. We
now have institutional frameworks both within the government and in the
private sector which bring research and clinical experimentation into steady
interaction with legal, ethical, and public concerns. Some lawyers, theologians, and philosophers have learned enough science to grasp the specific
quandaries faced by researchers and clinicians, and some of the latter have
learned to use the vocabulary of ethics. Dr. French Anderson's publications
are clear evidence of participation in this wider context of deliberation.
The starting focus of this presentation is Dr. Anderson's publications, authored individually and in collaboration with others, that include concerns
for ethics.2 Beyond this focus, various considerations come to the fore; an
expansion of the context makes this possible. If there is any increment of
novelty in this presentation, it will be small; Dr. Anderson has engaged literature written by persons whose work is similar to mine. Maybe some margins of reflection can be extended in a fruitful way.
How

ETHICAL ISSUES ARE FORMULATED

As an initial matter, it is necessary to construct a pattern of how Dr.
Anderson and other genetic therapists come to formulate the ethical dimensions of their activities. First, some comments on how they do not. They
are not natural, from which they draw inferences about the moral or religious legitimacy of certain interventions. Though they have background beliefs about the human being as part of the evolutionary process, these do not
dictate or determine their particular choices. They do not ordinarily come
armed with a single-minded ethical theory that they adopted as a result of
their studies of moral philosophy-a theory that can be applied rather deductively to each case at hand. They have been exposed to such theories, of
course, which are reflected in their view of ethical dimensions, but normally
are not adherents to a single ethical theory. They know that they are dealing
with the large and frequently debated issue of what constitutes the distinctiveness of the human being and what is the good, or are the goods, of the
2. For the purposes of this Essay, it is sufficient to focus on the following articles: W.
French Anderson, Genetics and Human Malleability, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb.
1990, at 21-24 [hereinafter Anderson, Malleability];W. French Anderson, Human Gene Therapy: Why Draw a Line?, 14 J. MED. PHIL. 681 (1989) [hereinafter Anderson, Draw a Line]; W.
French Anderson, Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considerations, 10 J. MED.
PHIL. 275 (1985) [hereinafter Anderson, Considerations]; W. French Anderson & John C.
Fletcher, Gene Therapy to Human Beings: When it is Ethical to Begin, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED.

1293 (1980).
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Put even more formally, the steps seem to be answers to the following
questions: 1) What can be done now given current knowledge conditions? 2)
What ought to be done now given this knowledge, and what reasons justify
that? 3) What, in various scenarios of the future, are genetic therapists likely
to be able to do? 4) What, in the light of present factors, scientific, ethical,
and public responses, should and should not be done in each of those scenarios? 5) What reasons are given for both authorizing and limiting possible
interventions?
Different reasons or evidence are offered to justify these questions. First,
there is evidence of scientific knowledge conditions-current ones, those on
the immediate horizon, and those that are probable in the more distant future. Second, there are ethical reasons derived from the current literature
and what is acceptable to an informed public. These include boards and
committees that must review all research proposals, e.g., informed consent
by the patient or a suitable surrogate and risk-benefit analysis with a judgment in favor of the benefits. They also include fairness or justice in access
to therapy, the value of liberty which rules out coercive use, and concerns
for various human goods-those that warrant therapy, those that do not,
and those that are now ambiguous. Third, there are appeals to what the
public will approve. And finally, there are larger beliefs about the human
being-what ought to be valued about human life (appeals to dignity, etc.)
that are belief conditions on which there is not complete agreement. The
analysis of Anderson's ethical articles continues by eliciting the judgments
made, proposed, or left open in each of these types of evidence.
First, regarding scientific knowledge conditions, the standard procedures
for preclinical trials are clearly necessary conditions. The judgment of when
to begin clinical trials is acknowledged as one involving probabilities of success, but in the case of a tragic and lethal disease "it would be just as inappropriate to delay treatment of patients while we are awaiting long-term
results in primates as it would be to rush into experimentation with patients
before studies of small animals have been completed." 3 Since genetic science
is rapidly developing, the choice about which therapies to use on humans,
and under what conditions, is an open, developing issue.
When the discussion moves from somatic cell therapies to germ-line, the
knowledge conditions must be specified differently. "It would require that
we learn how to insert a genome not only into the appropriate cell of the
patient's body, but also how to introduce it into the germ line of the patient
in such a way that it would be transmitted to offspring and would be func3. Anderson & Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1229. See also Anderson, Considerations,supra
note 2, at 278.
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human being. These are the objects of their theories. They are somewhat
perplexed, as are most of us, about how health as a human good is related to
other aspects of the human good, i.e., in what ways is it a condition for other
aspects of flourishing or whether it comes near to being an end in itself. But,
as Dr. Anderson's questions in his articles indicate, they do not have a simple coherent vision of the human good.
In one sense, the process genetic therapists engage is akin to the following.
New knowledge coming from basic research gives insight into the causal
factors involved in a genetically based human disease. Thus, the possibility
of new therapeutic interventions emerge. For both scientific and moral reasons, as Anderson and colleagues make clear, there has to be a sequence of
laboratory research prior to the first use of a genetic procedure on humans.
With the best evidence in hand, there is recognition of the risk factors to
human patients, and every bit of knowledge and care is used to minimize this
risk and to maximize the desired healthy outcome. They adhere to the voluntary principle; properly informed consent of the patient or a proper surrogate is given. Distinctions are made about the purposes and the biological
conditions of genetic therapy; radical eugenics is ruled out; enhancement
therapy is at a minimum questionable; germ-line intervention might be justifiable in the future, but caution about this therapy is communicated; somatic
cell therapy is sound given the accuracy of specific knowledge conditions for
a particular disease.
They then proceed with cautious confidence to prepare a protocol that is
justified by the scientific knowledge, the severity of the disease, the assessment of risks and other moral considerations, and the indication of the particular patient or patients for the experimental therapy. Their follow-up
procedures are clear and precise and their monitoring practices are insurance against both clinical and moral negligence on their part. They do not
promise complete cures, but high probabilities of improved health. Thus,
medically and ethically, they venture into an uncertain future; fallibility is
recognized, but the evidence supports a critical judgment that the intervention is worthy, when a whole range of considerations are taken into account.
They have decided that a particular intervention is good and right, both
medically and morally. Because of the nature of their vocation, the focus of
medical and ethical attention is on a particular act or a class of acts. The
normal conditions of moral responsibility have been met, given certain background beliefs and assumptions of our culture and institutions. What can be
done, in the case at hand, ought to be done. Somatic cell genetic therapy,
given proper knowledge conditions, ought to be undertaken. But there are
some interventions that, at least for the present, ought not to be done.

1992]

Genetic Therapy

tional in the correct way in the correct cells in the offspring." 4 As of 1985,
the technique of microinjecting a fertilized human egg was not acceptable for
three reasons: (1) the procedure had a high failure rate (implying that a low
enough failure rate might make it appropriate); (2) it could produce a deleterious result (implying that when such a result can be avoided it might be
appropriate); and (3) it would have limited "usefulness" (again implying that
when it would have greater usefulness it might be appropriate). 5 We will
cite the ethical question of this technique below.
The knowledge conditions for some enhancement therapies appear to be
in place, and, as human genetics develop, more possibilities of these therapies will increase. The ethical questions raised by Anderson about enhancement therapy are intertwined with the knowledge conditions requiring
further discussion hence. More immediately, the principal questions are
what constitutes a disease and what constitutes prevention rather than
enhancement.
Second, what ethical considerations are brought to bear to support judgments? As noted, Anderson affirms the standard conditions that review
committees must evaluate-a favorable risk-benefit ratio and consent by the
patient or a proper surrogate. In cases of lethal diseases when experimental
therapy might be done without the scientific certainty normally required, the
possible preservation of life overrides normal constraints. The ethical thinking is somewhat similar to thinking in the just-war tradition; after all nonviolent means to settling a dispute have been attempted, and given the conditions of a just cause, violence might be reasonable. The medical ethical warrant implied by Anderson is not new; the crisis of impending, but possibly
avoidable, death warrants extreme measures. One is impressed, however, by
the careful assessment of the risks and the acknowledgment of the seriousness of the medical judgment that must be made.
The ethical questions Anderson raises about germ-line therapy imply his
consideration of several values and concerns. One is the irreversibility of
outcomes; an inherited change could perpetuate any mistake. Another is
unanticipated outcomes. At this point the Catholic moral theological proce6
dures of the principle of double (or multiple) effects might be invoked. A
stringent response can be inferred, or is at least suggested, by Anderson.
Any germ-line therapy ought to be restrained until there is a high probability
that presently unforeseeable deleterious outcomes will not occur. This
would apply even if the foreseeable outcomes were beneficial to the patient
4. Anderson, Considerations,supra note 2, at 283.
5. Id. at 285.
6. Indeed, something like this procedure of reasoning seems implied in other of Anderson's moral evaluations.
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and progeny. One is not quite sure how Anderson would deal with this since
it is raised as a critical ethical question and not precisely answered.'
The conditions which warrant enhancement therapy "could be justified on
grounds of preventive medicine. ' '8 His well-chosen example relates to arteriosclerosis, and the case for undertaking this therapy is strong unless some
alternative therapy existed that did not involve genetic enhancement of the
conditions described. The line between enhancement and prevention, however, is not always as easily drawn. One thinks of the somewhat analogous
situation of cosmetic surgery. The argument that such surgery can enhance
self-esteem and improve performance in the competitive marketplace, etc.,
can also be made in the following way. It prevents loss of self-esteem which
is a necessary condition for human flourishing, including flourishing in the
marketplace. The difference between Anderson's example and this one is
that his is of a physical disease. The therapy would result in a more normal
functioning of the body. Cosmetic surgery is justified by certain cultural
values that are used to judge oneself or to judge other persons. Anderson
does, however, discuss growth hormones, which compare more closely to the
example of cosmetic surgery. In that discussion, he leaves us with a question
of its appropriateness: "Should a pubescent adolescent whose parents are
both five feet tall be provided with a growth hormone on request?" 9
These examples point to the broad question of what are the proper ends of
medicine, a question raised sharply by Leon Kass's much cited article, Regarding the End of Medicine and the Pursuit of Health. 0 The deep and
perplexing questions are whether the purpose of medicine is to remedy impediments to more "normal" bodily functions or to enhance some normal
functions? What constitutes the "normal?" Is the normal derived somehow
from the "natural?" For example, if the use of the growth hormone in Anderson's example were withheld, would that be justified on the grounds that
being relatively short is natural for that adolescent and therefore normal,
making use of the hormone wrong? Anderson raises this issue when he asks
what distinguishes a "serious disease" from a "minor disease from a cultural
discomfort?" "
Anderson also invokes the issue of fairness or justice in gaining access to
genetic therapy and particularly to enhancement therapy. He inquires as to
7. See Anderson, Considerations,supra note 2.
8. Anderson, Draw a Line, supra note 2, at 688.

9. Id. at 690.
10. LEON KASS,

TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE

157 (1985).

11. Anderson, Draw a Line, supra note 2, at 687, 689; see also Anderson, Malleability,
supra note 2, at 24.
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how to determine who should receive a gene. 2 The more specific questions
are those that have been raised about access to scarce medical resources.
Should the persons granted access be those who can most benefit society?
Those most in need medically to avoid significant suffering and premature
death? Those who are able to pay? Or should it be by casting lots? It would
be redundant to develop these last questions more; they are discussed widely
13
in the literature.
Anderson also asks how discrimination is to be avoided in gene therapy.
Again the specific issues are those that arise from any genetic screening:
Will persons be deprived of health insurance if they are not treated? Will
certain persons be coerced into forms of enhancement therapy in a time of
national crisis presumably for the same of the public good?14
The value of individual autonomy is invoked against any arguments that
would justify coercion even for the sake of a public good."5 It is clear that
the larger vision of a "good" society is one that protects individual liberties.
Whether there would ever be emergency circumstances that would override
individual autonomy seems to be ruled out.
Another ethical argument that Anderson invokes is the "slippery-slope."
He writes, "It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine where to
draw a line once enhancement engineering had begun. Therefore, gene
transfer should be used only for treatment of serious disease and not for
putative improvements." ' 16 In a sense we are already on this slippery slope
since the capability exists to engage in genetic engineering. As on other such
slopes, a site is located beyond which we ought not go. Some things ought
not to be done even though they can be done. Anderson's line between serious disease and "putative improvements" was commented on above; what is
the basis for drawing the distinction he has made?
Third, Anderson suggests the importance of public approval of possible
germ-line interventions.17 He indicates that public approval will evolve over
time. Thus, part of the medical-ethical strategy is to educate the public to
get its approval for therapies that are medically and ethically possible and
legitimate. Presumably a corollary of this is to gain support for discussion of
problematic possibilities and perhaps for drawing a firm line against some of
12. Anderson, Draw a Line, supra note 2, at 688.

13. See, e.g.,
CIETY

DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMrrs: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SO-

(1987) (discussing what the appropriate level of individual health care should be given

the existing lack of health care access and escalating costs).
14. Anderson, Draw a Line, supra note 2, at 688.
15. Id.
16. Anderson, Malleability, supra note 2, at 24.
17. Anderson, Considerations,supra note 2, at 286.
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them. There is a broadening context of discussion; experimental germ-line
therapies are not matters to be agreed upon only between physicians and
their patients or appropriate surrogates, as decisions about surrogate motherhood are.
The important practical question of how medically and ethically informed
public discussion is to take place is not broached in Anderson's articles. Persons who have attracted wide public attention, such as Nicholas Wade and
Jeremy Rifkin, are cited for their alarms about the potential abuse of power
that might slide down the slope to eugenics. Anderson is somewhat sympathetic to them as he asks are they really that far off the mark? I raise the
practical question because it is easier for prophetic alarmists to gain public
attention than it is for persons who are prudently complex about both the
medical and moral dimensions. Genetic therapy is just one example of a
larger issue in our society: How is an adequately informed public opinion to
be developed on critical and controversial issues? Do we have institutions
and processes in place for this to occur?
One of Anderson's discussions of germ-line therapy contains an intriguing
claim. "The gene pool is a joint possession of all members of society," which
would be affected by outcomes of germ-line therapy. 8 This demonstrates
his concern for public discussion and approval. Anderson does not specifically discuss the probabilities of long range beneficial or deleterious outcomes in the gene pool. Possession is a term that suggests a legal structure
invoking laws of property and requiring a local governmental authority to
determine its lawful use. The social, legal, and ethical ramifications of this
concept, if taken seriously, are great. Who is the guardian of the gene pool?
By what authority? What powers does the guardian have? How are they to
be exercised?
Fourth, and finally, in Anderson's writings, there are appeals to profound
background conditions, more belief conditions than scientific knowledge conditions. They are introduced by some of Anderson's questions. What constitutes human dignity? What is significant suffering? What is normal? His
1989 article,' 9 in particular, cites a breadth of literature by ecclesial authors
and groups, moral theologians and ethicists, and others that address these
perplexing questions. As noted earlier, Anderson does not seek to resolve
them, but is clearly conscious of them.
WHAT IS DISTINCTIVELY HUMAN?

The remainder of this paper will be no more successful in resolving the
18. Id.
19. See Anderson, Draw a Line, supra note 2.
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questions raised than Anderson has been, but serves to widen the discussion.
At this point, I move from particular attention away from Anderson's writings to broader issues.
We necessarily find ourselves in a morass. We are in an area of long and
continuing discussion and debate. Four principal and related questions arise
following a review of the literature. They are: 1) How do we adequately
describe and explain what is distinctively human?; 2) What do we value
about the human?; 3) What ought we to value about the human?; and 4)
How are our descriptions and explanations on the one hand related to our
valuations on the other? These questions are probably as old as critical
human self-consciousness. While the divisions of judgment on them are not
overcome, there may be some minimal consensus which makes an inviolable
standard of value in Western Culture.
Only three authors are quoted-from the many that could be used-to
show the pervasiveness of the quest for answers to these questions. Reinhold
Niebuhr opens the first volume of his 1939 Gifford Lectures as follows:
"Man has always been his own most vexing problem. How shall he think of
himself?" 20 Margaret Mead wrote, "'What must we do to be human' is a
question as old as humanity itself."2 1 Melvin Konner opens The Tangled
Wing with, "Why are we what we are, why do we do what we do, why do we
feel what we feel; these questions have been on the minds of philosophers
and theologians, medical men and medicine men, actors, diplomats, poets
and, of course, scientists, beginning with the first glimmer of human thought
itself."22 Carl N. Degler analyzes the history from the early impact of Darwinism to the pre-eminence of culture as the best explanation of human nature to the resurgence of biological considerations.2 3 James Luther Adams
wrote a penetrating essay in 1942, which focused on liberalism as a tradition." Citations to discussions, of course, could continue indefinitely. The
point here is to affirm that the background beliefs about what might support,
if not directly warrant, the moral legitimacy or proscription of certain genetic therapies in humans continue to be much debated.
Returning to the questions asked above, "How do we adequately describe
and explain what is distinctively human?" At one level, there is a biological
answer, namely that humans have a distinctive chromosome. This is a necessary condition for the distinctively human being. Noting its existence,
20. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN 1 (1941).
21. CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE 3 (1991).
22. MELVIN KONNER, THE TANGLED WING xi (1982).
23. See DEGLER, supra note 21.
24. JAMES LUTHER ADAMS, The Changing Reputation of Human Nature, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 14 (1986).
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however, is not a sufficient description or explanation of our humanness.
Our biological distinctiveness is both small and decisive. Without detailing
the arguments by various authors, focusing on the biological impresses many
writers in ethology and sociobiology with the continuity between the human
and other living creatures.
This orientation relies on the findings of science, and has been used to
interpret human activity in more deterministic ways. In response to such
interpretations, some writers, e.g., Barry Schwartz, pose a "battle" for
human nature between those who argue for the hegemony of the language of
science and the hegemony of the language of morality.2 5 The outcome of the
battle will affect the human sense of moral accountability. Other writers
who are disposed to biologically explain as much about the human being as
possible, like Konner, also want to include the human capacity for awe and
wonder which inhibits a reductionism and provides a basis for adhering to
what our culture reveres as humane values. Still others, Mary Midgely for
example, seek to avoid the language of battle and observe complementary
relation between what we are biologically, culturally, and morally. 26
Other authors from various disciplines stress the distinctiveness of the
human in radically different ways. Reinhold Niebuhr uses the language of
"spirit." Spirit is embodied but points to our capacities for freedom and selfdetermination. John Calvin says that it is "worship" that distinguishes
humans from what he calls, in typically sixteenth century western fashion,
"brutes."2 Sir John Eccles interprets the relation between brain and mind
in such a way that there can be an individual unique soul, and this belief
guards against tendencies to develop oppressive slave states.2" Rabbi Abraham Heschel sees the capacity to be responsive to ourselves, to others, and to
God as the proper description of the human.2 9
Moves have been made to some middle ground. Degler's historical account of American social thought sees the work of anthropoligist Franz
Boas and his students as the apex of interpretations which minimized, for a
period of time, the importance of biology and stressed the importance of
human capacities to create culture. Thus, humans were judged to be determined more by culture than biology. Degler's analysis shows that in more
recent decades the connection or relationship between the biological and the
25.

BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN NATURE: SCIENCE, MORALITY AND

MODERN LIFE 17-18 (1986).
26. See MARY MIDGLEY, HEART AND MIND
MAN: THE ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE (1978).

(1981);

MARY MIDGLEY, BEAST AND

27.

JOHN CALVIN, THE INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

28.
29.

JOHN

C. ECCLES, THE HUMAN MYSTERY 144, 236-37 (1979).
ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, WHO IS MAN? 16 (1965).

47 (1960).
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cultural is a focus of attention. 30 Theologian Edward Farley is not wholly
untypical of his discipline when he seeks to take account of the biological in
31
developing his theological interpretation of the human.
Is anything at stake in these arguments which affect, in at least some indirect way, choices about genetic therapy? The answer is not clear, but scenarios can be proposed which begin at opposite points of the discussion. First,
if we begin with views that tend toward biological determination, if not reductionism, research could focus on not only the biological conditions which
impede health but also those which might enhance the biological distinctiveness-with some presumed benefits in mind. Dr. Anderson raised one example in his articles, the improvement of memory. Should it become possible to
inject something which would improve memory, would we consider this beneficial enough to warrant experimentation and therapy? Emphasis on biological determinants of distinctively human activities and capacities has, and
could in the future, support both radical eugenics and enhancement therapies. These would be somewhat analogous to current use of performance
enhancing drugs. The main issue is what is naturally normal and does this
provide a moral guide?
Second, if we begin with those views that tend to stress freedom or voluntarism, spirit, responsiveness and responsibility, and creativity, one affirms
the present requirement of informed consent to an invasive procedure. But
in and of themselves, these qualities I shall call "spirit" could be more than a
basis for limiting interventions. Indeed, freedom and creativity are exercised
in the progressive development of biological knowledge and the development
of therapies. Human beings, being only slightly less than the angels-according to the much quoted eighth Psalm-have godlike capacities to master
and dominate nature. Alternatively, as Lynn White noted, they can exercise
dominion over nature according to a Genesis creation myth.3 2 White's theory, without consideration of other factors, could support aggressive intervention for the sake of human control and domination. To be human is to
maximize our creative capacities to order nature.
Several knotty issues arise in the literature on the nature of the human
being. From a more biologically deterministic view, how is the "human
spirit" explained-the sense of wonder, for example, that Melvin Konner
strongly affirms? From the more "spiritual" view, how does one take into
30. See
31.

DEGLER,

supra note 21.

EDWARD FARLEY, GOOD AND EVIL: INTERPRETING A HUMAN CONDITION 76-96

(1990).

32. Lynn White, The HistoricalRoots of our EcologicalCrisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203, 1203-07
(1967).
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account the evidence of genetic and other biological research with their increasing power to explain humans?
This is the point to comment on the biblical distinction that is invoked by
theologians to answer the question. The distinctively human being is both
explained and described by the assertion that human beings are created in
the image of God. The invocation of this biblical statement is less helpful
than one desires. There is an inherent circularity in the statement. With
varying interpretations of God come varying ideas about the image of God
that is in the human being. And, with varying interpretations of the distinctiveness of the human ascribed to both God and the human being in the
image of God, come varying interpretations of God. Historically, different
content has been ascribed to both God and the human being to reduce the
formality of the statement. For example, there are arguments for rationality
as the image, as there are for historicity or the capacities to be creative.
Recently the Canadian theologian, Douglas Hall argued for interrelatedness
as the image. 3 Sallie McFague suggests a variety of models of God each of
which would have a corollary for the image of God in the human, and for
the kinds of practices that are appropriate in an ecological and nuclear age.
She discusses two classic models, the monarchical and the idea of the world
as God's body, and then proposes consideration of God as mother, as love,
and as friend. 34
The moral function of the idea of humans created in the image of God, for
those who invoke it, seems to be that it is a regulative idea of respect for the
human and of fundamental equality of all humans. Its function is comparable to that of respect for persons in Kant's moral philosophy and other principles in other writings. It is not a principle, the content of which is positive
and full of defined "goods" or "values," but one that has to be raised as a
limit or even a question. Do certain therapeutic interventions violate the
principle of respect for humans? Is therapy available or accessible to all who
need it? This does not of itself, because of its formality, provide a positive
basis for precise determination of right or wrong interventions or who
should have access to therapies under specific conditions. But it is one answer to our first question in this series of four; it is an explanation and description of the distinctively human being.
What do we value about the human being? This is an empirical question.
One finds answers to it in various studies as well as in literature and art. An
inventory of answers would require a list pages long, showing cultural variations, class variations, and variations under different life circumstances.
DOUGLAS J. HALL, IMAGING GOD: DOMINION AS STEWARDSHIP 88-112 (1986).
34. See generally SALLIE MCFAGUE, MODELS OF GOD (1987).

33.
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General answers have been given. We value life itself, we value happiness or
well-being, we value our eternal destinies. What humans value about themselves is subject to moral scrutiny and judgment both by themselves and by
others. Thus, for example, there are those who believe that a technological
imperative exists in modern medical science that backs every effort to prolong the length of physical life. This seems to make extension of life an end
in itself and not take sufficient account of the qualities of the extended life.
The criticism is based upon various qualities that can be valued more highly
than life itself. Many examples could be cited for criticisms of what persons
or communities do value about life and of what we ought to value about
human life. In every case, it is clear that the major question is not solved by
opinion polls about what we value.
Still, it can be argued that individuals or communities have the freedom
and right to value what they choose to value. If this is so, then genetic
therapies could be directed by whatever can be done to fulfill a desired outcome for persons or communities. If persons desire, and thus value, greater
height than predicted on the basis of the height of their parents, growth
hormones would be licit. If memory enhancement is valued, then access to
therapies that enhance memory would likewise be licit. The "is" of whatever
is valued would determine the "ought" of what should be developed and
made accessible to persons.
It is clear that Dr. Anderson and others are not prepared at present to
make the fact that individuals value some possible outcome of genetic therapy sufficient ground for their receiving that outcome. Some "ought" is
functioning to limit and direct choices about therapy, if not research.
What ought we to value about the human? This is, of course, the most
crucial question, and genetic therapy is only one locus among hundreds in
which the question is relevant. A legitimate case can be made that we ought
to value many things about human life.
The history of earlier eugenics proposals is instructive at this point. Critics often cite geneticist S. J. Muller, who proposed to bank the semen of men
who were, in his judgment superior, and employ artificial insemination. He
chose names of men through history who he thought no intelligent and morally sensitive woman would refuse to father their children. Muller listed
Lenin in one version. Later Lenin was dropped and Einstein, Pasteur,
Descartes, da Vinci, and Lincoln were listed.3 5 During the flurry of literature on cloning a human being, critics asked which traits of the human
ought to be replicated in identical ways and in significant number by cloning.
35.
(1979).
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One of the first questions to this is always, "Who has the authority and the
power to determine what we ought to value about human life?" The specter
of authoritarian governments determining which persons ought to be eliminated from the human race because of certain "deficiencies," or because of
ethnic affiliations should haunt every reflection about answers to this question. More subtle forms of external determination have been cited in both
earlier and current stages of the uses of therapy that require scarce medical
resources. One thinks of the often told tale of the Seattle Dialysis Program
during the early stages of end-stage renal therapy in which a committee of
36
citizens attempted to use various social and other criteria of worthiness.
The availability of economic resources for medical care continues to mark a
line between those who have access to therapy and those who do not, between those whose beliefs about what ought to be valued about life can be
met and those whose beliefs cannot be met.
This question asks whether our society ought to determine policies on the
basis of "thick" theories of human good which define the desirable ends in
view on the basis of some authority, or a "thin" theory of good which tolerates a variety of conceptions of human good and works out procedures that
honor individual liberty and fairness so that access to genetic therapies is not
determined by the authority of the medical profession, insurance companies,
or other centers of power. In the ideal worlds of philosophers and theologians, principles can be worked out and procedures proposed to avoid some
unfairness and to honor self-determination. In the world of limited resources, which is always the case in experimental therapies, decisions have to
be made about what values of the human being ought to influence, if not
determine, who has access to therapy.
These decisions are made on the basis of medical criteria within the context of the state of knowledge and the nature of the diseases at hand. Dr.
Anderson, for example, invokes severity of disease as a criterion. In life
threatening circumstances, interventions are judged to be morally licit when,
under other circumstances, they would not. Attempts to analyze what factors go into these priority judgments have been made elsewhere and will not
be elaborated on.37
Karl Barth wrote, "Life is no second God, and therefore the respect due
to it cannot rival the reverence owed to God.", 38 This makes the theological
point that whatever we value and ought to value about life is at least relative
to the respect owed to the creator, sustainer, and orderer of our life. The
36. See RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL 226-65 (rev. ed.
1978).
37. JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 254-77 (1984).
38. KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS 342 (1961).
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practical inference is toward what we ought not to value about human life;
the sheer perpetuation of it for its own sake as a form of idolatry. This
would be an effort to transcend human mortality, and to usurp, in Barth's
language, the prerogatives of God.
While there without doubt have been, and continue to be, medical interventions whose purpose is simple prolongation of biological functions, nothing in Dr. Anderson's justifications of genetic therapy appeal to this end.
There have been discussions about research into the genetics of the aging
process and possible justifications for interventions once those genetic factors
are discovered. Leon Kass has written a profound critique of such proposals: "Once we acknowledge and accept our finitude, we can concern ourselves with living well, and care first and most for the well-being of our souls,
and not so much for their mere existence." 39 Paul Ramsey made a similar
point in one of the better one-liners he bequeathed us: "Men ought not to
play God before they learn to be men, and after they have learned to be men
they will not play God."'4
These views, derived not only from proposals to intervene in the aging
process but also from other proposals for radical genetic therapies, have a
prophetic function. They look below, beneath, or beyond particular proposed therapies and present us with a warning to be heeded. But the prophetic warning does not resolve the clinical issues; "well-being of our soul"
does not in itself specify what ought to be valued about living well, though
Kass has more to say about that than can be cited here.
THE MORAL STATUS OF THE NATURAL HUMAN LIFE

The most difficult issue, the one that puzzles without a firm resolution, is
this: What is to be judged as natural in human life, and how is what we
judge to be valued about life related to the natural? This is to ask question
four: How are descriptions and explanations of the human related to valuations of it? In one sense, every genetic therapy is justified on the ground that
it either relieves an impediment to proper natural functioning, as in preventive somatic cell therapy and possibly in some future germ-line therapies, or
improves some aspect of the natural that is especially valued in enhancement
therapy and radical eugenics. Put a bit differently, what is normal in our
biological processes, and what is judged to be abnormal and thus worthy of
correction by preventive genetic therapy? What is judged to be normal such
that it is worthy of such higher valuation that it warrants enhancement or
radical eugenics?
39. KASS, TOWARDS A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 314 (1985).
40. RAMSEY, supra note 35, at 138.
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Philosophically, this raises the much discussed question of the relation of
the "is" to the "ought," but in the abstract any resolution of that does not
necessarily resolve particular clinical choices. Some judgment of what
"is"--e.g. a medical condition -is seen as a threat to certain goods or values
of human well-being, implying an "ought". Or what "is"---e.g. a decent
memory-might be judged to be of such value that it ought to be enhanced.
Some reference to medical conditions is critical to what ought not to be done
as well as what ought to be done. In the ought not, as well as the ought, in
some sense (and in the some lies the puzzle), the biologically natural is referred to as normal. That normal is at least one of the bases on which a
judgment about the moral propriety of therapy is made. Those bases clearly
shift with the development of knowledge about genetics as they have with
the development of other aspects of biological research. New genetic knowledge becomes the condition for enlarging therapeutic interventions, for different moves from what is known more accurately as research develops to
what ought or ought not to be done. But the ought, or ought not, is not
simply logically deductible from that knowledge.
Only persons with certain religious beliefs could claim that medical therapies are always illegitimate and that "nature" should be permitted to take its
course under all circumstances, even if this leads to readily avoidable suffering or premature death. At the other extreme, death denying (a preferred
term for what usually are called life prolonging) therapies are used on an
individual moral judgment basis. Most of us find our beliefs somewhere between the extremes.4 '
When one argues that certain interventions ought never to be undertaken,
one does well to remember some history in which interventions were said to
be wrong on the basis of "do no harm," or other principles. "Do no harm"
can be interpreted in a restrictive way, inhibiting developments in the relief
of suffering and avoidance of premature death. The functioning limit of using therapies only for preventive purposes assumes that the procedure will
eliminate or deter a threat to what is judged a normal functioning of the
organism. One is reminded of Thomas Aquinas, who believed that surgery
was justified when it removed a threat to the well-being of the whole bodysociety. What is the contrasting injunction to "do no harm?" Is it "benefit
to the extent possible?" Practically, do no harm has been a restriction of
means in the process of making benefits possible. The benefits seem to have
come from the restoration of more "normal" functioning of the body until
recent decades.
41. Richard Landau & James M. Gustafson, Death is not the Enemy, 252 JAMA 2458
(1984).
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My impression is that in justifications of experimental or routine therapies, the biologically normal functions are one basis for the medical-moral
choice. A statistical norm is used or implied. The abnormal condition is
that which threatens the normal, and its abnormality warrants intervention
given adequate knowledge and other conditions. The normal alters with various conditions; what is normal for a young person is not normal during old
age. The normal, then, fluctuates and deviations from it have to be described
and judged for their severity. But in experimental genetic and other therapies, this is not sufficient to justify an intervention.
Dr. Anderson's and others' restraints on enhancement therapies and radical eugenics are based on a conviction that the naturally normal in a biological sense is the basis for a moral norm. They can find no compelling moral
justification for improving the naturally normal in most or all possible cases.
For the theologian, this raises a question which also can be raised from
other starting points, namely, what is the relation of the naturally normal to
what one might want to claim about the divine ordering of life-biologically
and humanly? Is the theologian justified in setting Anderson's biologically
normal in the larger context of meaning and value that theology attempts to
speak about? There is no consensus about this in historical or contemporary
western theology. Other efforts to deal with this issue are published elsewhere and are too complex to develop here.4 2 God, the ultimate power, is
ordering life in the world through the patterns and processes of interdependence. These patterns and processes are one basis for ethics, but not a sufficient one. From one theological perspective, it can be concluded that a
careful assessment of Dr. Anderson's articles on ethics are conscientious efforts to discern not only what genetic therapies would be morally justified
but also which would be religiously and theologically supported.
If there is reason for some confidence that conditions of moral responsibility are being met by Anderson and others, what are they, and how can they
be sustained and enhanced? Previously, developments over the past twenty
years that enhance moral responsibility have been mentioned. Anderson's
concern for the public implicitly acknowledges a political dimension that
must be taken into account. Success in bringing morality to bear on genetic
and other experimental therapies has come from the development of regulations that have to be met and from the conscientiousness of investigators and
an informed public. In effect, moral interest groups have gained access to
persons of authority to set these regulations. Regulations were established
because the moral trustworthiness of investigators has been challenged.
Surely what is needed are more of what I have called "communities of moral
42. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 37.
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discourse" in which the scientific, medical, ethical, and political issues are
engaged by informed and intelligent persons who represent different interests
and different perspectives on the nature of humanness and human well-being. Churches, universities, and other institutions can provide some of the
specialization and diversity needed to include the many considerations that
should be addressed. Media presentations often focus on the more dramatic
and esoteric possibilities; they use what Hans Jonas has called the "heuristics
of fear" to alert persons to potential and actual dangers.4 3 There is no substitute, however, for the hard work of cross-disciplinary discourses which
involves sufficient knowledge of the information, concepts, and ways of
thinking represented by specialties and interests.'

43. See HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHICS
FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1984).
44. Oral and written exchanges with Professor Donald Rutherford, Department of Philosophy, Emory University. While these exchanges were focused on a different project pertaining

to Dr. Anderson's work, they stimulated the renewal of my attention to the ethics of genetic
therapy. I gratefully acknowledge the importance of these interactions, which may perhaps
result in a more specific analysis than is rendered here.

